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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tressed by an opinion containing thorough and convincing reasoning. 7
Manipulation of "traditional words" is no replacement for critical analy-
sis. The Dillon majority's avoidance of cogent policy considerations is
a principal weakness and the decision may very likely be of little aid
to future plaintiffs in similar factual circumstances.
ROBERT C. ROTH
Constitutional Law: Fair Labor Standards Act: Maryland v.
Wirtz-In Maryland v. Wirtz,' the State of Maryland was joined by
twenty-seven other states and one school district in bringing an action
to enjoin the Secretary of Labor from enforcing the 1961 and 1966
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.2 The Act was
passed to impose, inter alia, minimum wage and maximum hour work-
ing conditions for employees engaged in interstate commerce. The Con-
gress, under the power of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3
extended coverage of the Act to all employees "engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce."' 4 At the time the 1938
Act was passed Congress excluded from the definition of interstate
commerce employer, "the United States or any State or political sub-
division of a State." In 1966 the Act was amended and coverage was
extended to all employees of any "enterprise" engaged in commerce
or the production of goods for commerce.6 This new feature of the
Act became known as the "enterprise concept." In Wirtz v. First State
Abstract & Insurance Co.,7 the Supreme Court classified employees as
being subject to the "enterprise concept" if their activities were "di-
rectly and vitally related to interstate commerce."8 In Wirtz v. Charles-
ton Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,9 enterprise was defined as:
[T]he related activities performed (either through unified oper-
ation or common control) by any person or persons for a com-
mon business purpose, and includes all such activities whether
performed in one or more establishments or by one or more
27 The majority in Dillon declared that contributory negligence of the injured
daughter would have defeated the mother's claim. Was the majority declaring
that contributory negligence can be imputed from a child to its mother? If
so, this is a revolutionary change in tort law-especially so, since the court
little discussed its merits. Alternatively, was the majority stating that the
mother's injury was a part of the child's cause of action? The opinion pro-
vides little in the way of a correct interpretation.
1392 U.S. 183 (1968).
2 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1964).
- U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4 Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964).
5 Id. § 203 (d).
6 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II,
1966).
7 362 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1966).
8 Id. at 87.
9237 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. S.C. 1965), rev'd 356 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966).
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corporate or other organizational units, including departments
of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements. 10
In 1966 Congress again amended the 1938 Act and eliminated some
of the exclusions provided for in the original Act. After these amend-
ments the Act applied to enterprises:
[E]ngaged in the operation of a hospital, an institution primar-
ily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or
defective who reside on the premises of such institution, a school
for mentally or physically handicapped or gifted children, an
elementary or secondary school, or an institution of higher ed-
ucation (regardless of whether or not such hospital, institu-
tion, or school is public or private or operated for profit or
not for profit).'"
A further amendment in 1966 abrogated the Act's exclusion of the
"United States .. . States . . . or political subdivision of a state.' 12
The effect of the 1961 and 1966 amendments to the Act was to (1)
enlarge the category of employees covered but not to affect the em-
ployers by enlarging that category, and (2) place state hospitals, schools,
and institutions under coverage of the Act via the "enterprise concept."
It was these particular extensions which the petitioner in Maryland v.
Wirtz sought to prevent on the constitutional ground that the "enter-
prise concept" is not within the power of Congress under the Com-
merce Clause. Coverage of state institutions was also felt to be beyond
the power of Congress. The petitioner claimed that the remedies pro-
vided by the Act are in conflict with the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution,' 3 and that hospitals and schools do not bear the neces-
sary relationship to interstate commerce to warrant federal jurisdic-
tion. A three-judge district court decided that Congress did have the
power to institute the "enterprise concept" and extend coverage of the
Act to state institutions. The district court failed to decide if an Elev-
enth Amendment conflict had resulted from the extended coverage, nor
did the district court address itself to the argument that state in-
stitutions do not bear the necessary relationship to interstate com-
merce to warrant federal jurisdiction.' 4
The basis for the constitutional approval of the "enterprise con-
cept" and the extended coverage to state employees under the amended
Fair Labor Standards Act was the same as the basis used to validate
the original act. The Supreme Court of the United States in United
10 237 F. Supp. at 864. -
"'Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (4) (1964), as amended, (Supp.
II, 1966).
12 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1964).
"3 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.14 Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967).
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States v. Darby15 approved the 1938 Act on the basis of the authority
given Congress by the Commerce Clause. The Court stated that Con-
gress had the power to regulate activities which have a "substantial
effect" on commerce. 6 The test of whether Congress has power to
legislate in a particular area was defined in Katzenbach v. McClung"?
where the Court enunciated the doctrine that if Congress has a "rational
basis" for regulation the Supreme Court's duty of investigation is at
an end. Just as the "substantial effect" and "rational basis" standards
were made by the original Act, said the Court, so were they met by
the amendments.' 8
The passage of the original Act resulted from Congress' realiza-
tion that substandard working conditions lead to labor disputes, strife
and disruption within the enterprise itself. The particular enterprises
which Congress was trying to protect by the amendments (i.e., hospi-
tals and schools) are necessary and vital to the community. On the
"rational basis" of the protection of the general welfare through use
of the police power given Congress by the Commerce Clause, it seems
the prevention of disruption of these operations of the state would
justify the congressional action taken. The consequential impairment
to commerce due to labor strife is a "substantial effect." Work stoppage
will inhibit sales and purchases of goods such as drugs, books and
other materials made and shipped through interstate commerce. Pre-
vention of this situation was approved in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.19
The Act and the amendments were passed to foster free and fair
competition. It was decided in Darby that if substandard working con-
ditions, wages and excess hours were to exist in one enterprise and
not in another, a cost differential between the two enterprises would
result. Subsequent price cuts would attract buyers to one state's in-
dustry and drive business away from another state's industry which
observed a higher and costlier standard. Setting a uniform labor cost
standard would help promote fair competition by nullifying the ability
of a state and its industry to avoid minimum labor standards.
The application of this argument to the amendments seems inap-
propriate due to the local nature of the hospitals and schools covered
in the Act. The element of competition is lacking in these areas, at
least so far as public institutions are concerned. The public does not
usually enter the market to select, on a cost basis, which institutions
they will patronize for medical care, nor do they decide on a price
basis to which public school they will send their children.
15312 U.S. 100 (1941).
'6 Id. at 119.
17379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).18Id. at 303-04.
'p301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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It seems that extension of the Act is also justified by Congress'
interest in protecting the safety, health and morals of the employees
involved. The Court in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish20 upheld a
Washington statute authorizing the setting of minimum wages for
women employees. The Court stated that:
In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the
legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order
that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and
that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations
designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom
from oppression.21
In addition to the traditional grounds for approval, newer grounds
were presented to back up the validity of the amendments. In Wirtz v.
Edisto Farms Dairy,2 the Court pointed out that the "enterprise con-
cept" did not mean that if a few employees handled goods in interstate
commerce, all employees of that enterprise would be engaged in inter-
state commerce. Accordingly, the 1961 amendment merely states that
"an enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce, if it has any persons
handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been moved
in or produced for interstate commerce. ' 23 As seen by the Court, Con-
gress has enlarged the category of employees but not the category of
employers. Therefore the "enterprise concept" does not change the
meaning of interstate commerce nor expand congressional power be-
yond its constitutional boundary.
The additional coverage of the employees is a practical and useful
extension of the original Act. In the Act's amended form the chances
of labor strife and disruption are further reduced. The definition of
interstate commerce has not been tampered with nor has Congress'
power been expanded due to passage of the amendments.
The Court admits that the application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state institutions is an interference with state functions but
stresses that interference will not be as broad as anticipated by the
dissent.24 The Act continues to exempt "any employee employed in a
bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity" (including
any employee employed as academic administrative personnel or as
a teacher in elementary or secondary schools) .25 The Court justifies
extension of the Act to non-administrative personnel, not contained in
the above exception, by emphasizing the fact that the vital policy-
making functions of the state will not be impinged upon by the federal
20 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
21Md at 393.
22242 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. S.C. 1965).
231d. at 5.
24392 U.S. at 201 (dissenting opinion).
25 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(1) (1964).
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government due to continuing exclusion of administrative personnel
from coverage under the Act. It seems, however, that coverage of the
non-administrative personnel could be justified on the "rational basis"
or "substantial effect" theories if the danger of unfair competition and
labor strife arose between the state and these employees.
At present there is much agitation on the part of teachers and other
municipal and state employees to secure the right to bargain collectively
with school boards and other officials. To date, a few states including
Wisconsin and Michigan 26 have protected this right by statute. If the
remainder of the states do not respond by granting collective rights,
the philosophy of this case serves notice that Congress could become
interested in the granting of the right. The possibility of this happen-
ing may influence more states to make their own laws regulating col-
lective bargaining.
Justice Douglas in his dissent joined in by Justice Stewart favors
Maryland's argument that the United States is interfering with the
states' sovereign power. He feels that the impact of the amended Act
is "pervasive" and strikes at all levels of state government. Justice
Douglas agrees with the tests used by the Court but feels the Court
should go beyond the tests and balance the federal government's need
for regulation against the need for uninterrupted maintenance of states'
institutions and fiscal stability.2 7 There is no doubt that the states' fiscal
policies will be somewhat disrupted by the increased wages required by
the Act. justice Douglas feels that when this disruption is weighed
against the "rational basis" concept for regulation, the result will be
the protection of sovereignty of the states as reserved by the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
2 8
The Court has recognized the right of Congress to regulate state
proprietary functions. 29 The Court has also sustained the regulation
of essential and traditional state government services. In Sanitary Dist.
of Chicago v. United States,80 in which the issue was the District's
right to divert water from Lake Michigan in quantities greater than
allowed by the federal law, the Court stated:
There is no question that this power [to remove obstructions
to interstate and foreign commerce] is superior to that of the
States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their in-
habitants.3'
26 WIs. STAT. § 111.70 (1967); MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (1969).
27 392 U.S. at 201-05 (dissenting opinion).
28 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
29 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) ; United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175 (1936) ; Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois v. United States,
289 U.S. 48 (1933).80266 U.S. 405 (1925).
31 Id. at 426.
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It is apparent from this statement that the Court will not consider
resulting interruption of the fiscal activities of the state in validating
federal law regulating interstate commerce. The fact that fiscal disrup-
tion will occur if the state is forced to meet the wage and hour re-
quirements of the Act is in no way different from the fiscal disruption
suffered by the Sanitary District in disposing of sewage in a different
and probably more expensive manner.
Failure to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act subjects
employers, including the states in the areas covered by the Act, to
suit by the employee and by the Secretary of Labor. 2 This raises
problems concerning state immunity from suit but the Court declined
to discuss the impact of the Act on the doctrine of state sovereignty
and stated it would not overturn the amendment to the Act on the basis
of future contingencies. The amendments, if found to be invalid by the
Court in relation to regulation of state institutions, will not be totally
void due to a separability clause attached to the Act which makes all
parts of the Act not specifically declared unconstitutional valid and in
force.33
The "picture" painted by the Supreme Court in supporting the
meeting of the "rational basis" and "substantial effect" tests is tainted
by the application of the "enterprise concept" to basically non-com-
petitive entities operated by the state and long recognized as within the
sovereign sphere of the state. Although federal regulation has been ex-
tended to proprietary and other similar functions of the state, the regu-
lations have never come quite so close to the heart of state government
itself. This does not mean that the door will be open to federal regula-
tion of all state government activities under the guise of the "enterprise
concept" as Justice Douglas predicts. Neither the Congress nor the
Court ever intimated that this would be the result.
For the present, the application of the "enterprise concept" and the
extensions of coverage to the state as an employer are amply supported
by the superiority of the federal regulation on behalf of the general
welfare of the people through the commerce power. The state as a
sovereign has only that power which has not been given to the federal
government. In this case the power of Congress to control activities
which "substantially affect" commerce is one delegated to the federal
government and is superior to the interests of the state.
E. JOHN RAAscH
321air Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964).
33 "If any provision of this chapter or the application of such provision to any
person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter and
the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall
not be affected thereby." Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1964).
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